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Introduction
Dividend policy is a major financial decision. Despite theories suggesting that dividend policy has no significant impact on the changes in corporate value (Miller & Modigliani, 1961) , extant studies find that dividend works as a signal and influences asset valuation (Asquith & Mullins, 1983; Brickley, 1983; Grinblatt, Masulis, & Titman, 1984; Ross, 1977) . Studies in behavioral finance present debates over dividend initiation, dividend desire, and dividend catering theories that exhibit an increasing amount of evidence of asset misevaluation by investors (Asquith & Mullins, 1983; Baker & Wurgler, 2004; 2007; Subrahmanyam, 2007) .
Additionally, the phenomenon where financial managers time the market in view of taking advantage of investor sentiment are found to be in line with corporate value changes (Asquith & Mullins, 1983; Brickley, 1983) . Consequently, the issue of why corporations actually pay dividends becomes an important research question at both the academic and policy levels (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Teoh, 2002; Denis & Osobov, 2008) .
A dividend is a direct form of cash flow to investors. A higher (lower) amount of dividends provides positive (negative) signals for the valuation of assets.
Alongside cash dividends, studies have found that stock dividends and stock split announcements have a positive impact on stock prices (See Grinblatt, et al., 1984 and references therein expected that dividends are perceived as tangible benefits to investors when valuing any company. Investors desire more dividends. However, Fama and French (2001) presented the disappearing dividends effect among American investors claiming that dividends are no longer an important vehicle for attracting investors. In response to this argument, 2004) found that the propensity to pay dividends is driven by the catering incentive. The catering theory of dividends purports that corporations will pay dividends only if they perceive a demand for the same from the market (Baker & Wurgler, 2004 ).
Thus, there will be higher dividend payouts if the market provides a premium for the stock price. It is this premium that creates the catering incentive and thus explains the corporate tendency to pay dividends. Baker and Wurgler (2004) argued that if dividend payment is influenced by stock market performance (or vice versa), investor sentiment would be a major reason behind this causal relationship. Consequently, disequilibrium in the market reveals the tendency to relate dividends to the market value of corporations. This study examines the presence of dividend catering theory and the influential power of dividends in corporate valuation among the listed firms in Malaysia. Similar to Baker and Wurgler (2004) , if corporate performance influences corporate dividend payment, the study may conclude that some performance-related motivational force is driving the propensity to pay dividends. The study also investigates the influence of different industries (such as construction and trading) on the determinants of corporate value and dividend catering incentives.
Dividend and Other Determinants of Corporate Valuation
A number of studies in the West and recently in emerging markets have identified a list of determinants for corporate valuation. Theoretically, better quality investments should positively influence the value of corporations in the market (Morgado & Pindado, 2003) .
The term quality investment, in most of the studies, refers to investments having a positive net present value. Myers (1977) found that the effect of debt financing in investment decisions was negative. Jensen (1986) argued that investment interacts with availability of free cash flow, agency conflict and corporate financing policies when determining the value of corporations.
Companies with higher debt have the opportunity to offer external stakeholders control, providing the corporations with transparency and effective checks and balances. However, involving external stakeholders may result in agency conflict, which could be flagged by investors as being a negative signal. On average, however, an increase in positive NPV projects would positively influence corporate value. Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) presented similar results by reporting that investment performance depends on how financing decisions are made.
The vehicle for corporate financing -debt or equity -has a significant impact on the value of corporations. Fama and French (1999) found that U.S. corporations mostly use long-term debt for expansion. These firms rely on equities only during merger and acquisition activities. Investment performance and dividend policy simultaneously influence the effect of external financing on firm performance. Although firms gain external control through debt financing (Berger & Di Patti, 2006) , higher dependency on debt financing may result in poor performance given that the investment decisions are below average quality (Abor, 2005; 2007; Lang, Ofek, & Stulz, 1996) . On the other hand, the use of debt positively influences the performance of reputed firms (Campello, 2006; Harris & Raviv, 1991) .
The existing literature displays the effect of dividends on corporate value. Dividends work as a signal and carry both positive and negative impacts. Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984) found that dividends positively influence corporate value. Baker and Wurgler (2007) discovered that dividend premiums are a significant proxy of investor sentiment in the market. They concluded, similarly to Brown and Cliff (2005) Campello (2006) found a positive relationship between profitability and firm value. Jensen (1986) found free cash flow to be significant in explaining corporate value with respect to debt policy and agency cost. A number of studies exhibit the influence of non-financial variables (such as corporate governance related factors) on the value of the firm. Miller (1994) noted that effective corporate governance positively influences the control structure of the firm, thus balancing relationships among stakeholders. Board other studies found a significant negative influence of large board size on firm performance (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006) .
Various proxies measure corporate performance.
Many studies used firm performance and firm value (especially market performance and market value) interchangeably. Return on Asset (ROA) is used as a measure for financial performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006) , whereas Tobin's Q is reported as a proxy for financial and market performance in various studies (Chua, Eun, & Lai, 2007) . Chua et al. (2007) reported that Tobin's Q is the proxy for perceived corporate value by the investors. Tobin (1969) explained the Q ratio as being the determinant of how investors reward and penalize the firms' financial decisions. Thus, Tobin's Q can work as a proxy for financial, market and investor perception. Other than Tobin's Q, various studies rely on stock price as a measure for market performance. However, due to the frequent volatility of the stock price, which requires additional analysis, making a valid proxy from stock returns to represent firm performance is somewhat questionable.
Empirical Models
The major objectives of this study include determining key factors behind corporate valuation among listed firms in Malaysia to determine the influence of significant factors in different industries and to determine the presence of the dividend catering incentive in overall corporate valuation and in selected industries.
Equation 1 lists a number of determinants along with the proxy for corporate value. Table 2 
This study examines the presence of dividend catering theory in Malaysian corporations. A number of studies explain how corporate managers take advantage of high market value while announcing dividends, mergers and acquisitions, and new stock offerings (Alti, 2006; Baker & Wurgler, 2002; 2004; 2007; Lamont & Stein, 2005) . According to dividend catering theory, payers will offer dividends if there is market demand for dividends. Therefore, firms that would pay divi- Issue 4 99-110 2013 the tangible expectation of the investors for receiving dividends in the current year. However, there may be differences in companies offering higher and lower dividends. Investors may demand higher dividends in the current year if dividends were higher the previous year. Thus, more than an average dividend in the previous year would create a positive demand for dividends in the current year. To examine these three conditions, the study uses the following three equations.
Data and Method
Due to the structural differences of listing require- The study uses panel data, which has become increasingly important in developing countries due to the paucity of time series data (Gujarati, 2003) . In the panel data method, the study can control for cross section fixed effects (Baltagi, 2005 Baltagi (2005, p. 12 ) noted that it is better to run a fixed effect when selecting a fixed number of companies and the result is analyzed among these firms. However, a random sampling of companies from a population should produce a random effect. Researchers can check whether to conduct fixed or random effects based on secondary tests, such as the Hausman test. If the analysis rejects the null hypothesis, the study should concentrate on the fixed effect (Ahn & Moon, 2001 ). Hausman statistics follow Chi Square distribution with k degrees of freedom, where k is the number of independent variables. To fulfill the objective, the study conducted three sets of analyses. In the first stage, the study used multiple regressions involving the Q ratio as the dependent variable and the other five independent variables (given in equation 1) to examine the determinants of corporate value. In the second stage, equation (1) is tested for each of the four top industries. In the third stage, equations (2), (3) and (4) Table 3 provides a number of descriptive statistics. Industrial production (IP) produces the highest Q ratio (Q t-1 ) among the selected sample, which is theoretically (Table 4) reject the null hypothesis, hence supporting fixed effects models. Table 5 shows a number of key indicators explaining corporate value (Q ratio) for the Malaysian market. As expected from the literature, Dividend per Share (DPS) is robust between the total sample and the three (out of four) industry groups. DPS represents approximately 21% (highest) and 14% (second highest) of changes in the Q ratio in the PR industry and the total sample, respectively. Similar to Grinblatt et al. (1984) , cash DPS positively influences corporate value. Table 5 . ** 27% firms had CEO duality, *** 50% firms paid dividends higher than the median value.
Discussion of the Findings

Key Determinants of Corporate Valuation
Evidence of Dividend Catering Theory in Malaysia: Implications for Investor Sentiment
Corporate value in property (PR) and consumer products (CP) industries exhibits a higher positive influence of 17% in both cases compared to other industry groups. Positive debt and negative investment results are in line with Myers (1977) because it is expected that the investment decisions were below the average standard as the financial crisis was approaching. However, similar to Jensen (1986) , higher debt may result in better stakeholder control over firm management, thus resulting in positive debt-value relationships. Given the negative debt-investment relationship, similar to Lang et al. (1996) , a positive debt-value relationship is possible because the Malaysian firms are not heavily dependent on debt (average DEBT is 23% (Table 3) .
Duality is insignificant in almost all sectors except for property. It was interesting to observe a conflict between duality and the lag value of the Q ratio, which may lead to challenging future research on governance and firm performance.
A large number of board members (BOARD Notes: *** = Significant at 1%, ** = at 5% and * = at 10%. Hudaib (2006) . Table 5 shows that the R 2 of the estimates are significantly above conventional norms. Additionally, the Durbin Watson (DW) statistics are under control. Higher standardized beta coefficients of DPS and Q (t-1) lead to further inquiry on the dividend catering incentive.
Dividend Catering
Dividend catering theory argues that corporations offer dividends if there is market demand for dividend payment. Thus, to examine the existence of dividend catering incentives, equations (2), (3) and (4) should be significant and robust across industries. Table 6 highlights the tests for these three equations for the total sample and for four industry groups. One of the major arguments behind dividend catering theory is that market value drives the propensity to pay dividends. Table 6 shows that the Q ratio (proxy for market performance) The market may also expect that the company with a positive dividend the previous year may offer dividends in the current year. In equilibrium, dividends from the previous year should not be related to dividends in the current year. Dividends therefore depend on factors other than dividends from the previous year. Table 6 shows that dividends from the previous year (DPS t-1 ) significantly influence the current year's dividends. Among the sectors, trading TS and PR are the two sectors with very high coefficients.
Additionally, investors may expect that the companies with higher dividends may continue to pay higher dividends. Thus, they will expect higher dividends and by the grace of catering incentives, managers should look for sources of income to provide higher dividends. The proxy for higher dividends, DPOUT, significantly influences DPS in all sectors as well as the total sample. The beta coefficients are also high.
Thus, market forces drive corporations and investor sentiment while paying higher dividends. Three of our proxies, through equations 2, 3 and 4, establish that corporate managers time the market for their dividend announcement activity. 2004) theoretically support the performance proxy (DPS and Q in equation 2) and size proxy (DPS and DPOUT).
A Comprehensive Model
After analyzing the dividend catering incentive, the study revises the preliminary estimates of the key determinants. Table 7 exhibits robust results for DPS, DEBT, . The study finds a new variable, DPOUT, significant while explaining the changes in corporate value in Malaysia. Additionally, the R 2 and DW statistics for the estimates are satisfactory. Among these variables, Q (t-1) is the most influential variable, followed by DPS, DEBT, DPOUT and BOARD. incentive creates disequilibrium in the market because it leads to the conclusion that corporations pay dividends not because they have a reserve of income but because investors want dividends as a tangible income.
Conclusion
Thus, investor sentiment plays a crucial role in dividend payout decisions in Malaysia.
